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PlainLanguage
Readability Formulas and Specifications
for a "Plain English" Statute - Part 2
by Reed Dickerson
In 1965 Reed Dickerson, Professor
of Low at the University of Indiana Law
School, wrote the classic Funda-
mentals of Legal Drafting, published by
Little Brown and Co., Boston, a book
that has become the most referred to of
all books on legal drafting. Little
Brown and Co. will soon be publishing
Professor Dickerson's Second Edition of
Fundamentals of Legal Drafting. With
the permission of the author and the
publishers, the Michigan Bar Journal
and the Plain English Committee are
pleased to present excerpts from a
chapter in the Second Edition regard-
ing plain English statutes and read-
ability. "Part I - History, the Problem
and the Case for a Statute" was pre-
sented last month. "Part 2 - Read-
ability Formulas and Specifications for
a Plain English Statute" is presented
this month.
Readability Formulas
ome "plain English" statutes
(usually those relating to insur-
ance policies) measure readability by
readability formulas, especially that
developed by Rudolf Flesch. Ironi-
cally, these statutes have provoked
attacks on readability formulas gen-
erally.16 Here, we should distinguish
between the use of these formulas as
general measures of readability, for
which they have a fairly good track
record, and their use as guides to the
specifics of simplification, for which
they are almost useless.17 The differ-
ence can be documonted by Flesch's
own works. Although for reading
purposes Flesch relies only on word
length and sentence length, for writ-
ing purposes he relies also on such
factors as use of the active voice, use
of the first or second person, and
preferment of verb forms over syn-
onymous noun forms.
In a "plain English" statute,
no readability formula should be
adopted unless it is adequate also as
a guide to redrafting, which it prob-
ably cannot be.18 Otherwise, the con-
scientious redrafter may be lured in-
to a false sense of accomplishment by
emphasizing the factors relied on by
the readability test to the neglect of
the many other factors needed for
clarity and readability.
Clarity and readability differ
significantly. Robert and Veda
Charrow in their study of jury in-
structions, appear to have concen-
trated mainly on clarity; Flesch has
concentrated on mere readability. A
document can meet the Flesch (or
Gunning) test 100 percent without
rising above gibberish. What is
needed here is a general performance
standard of decently readable
substantive clarity (as adopted by
New York's Sullivan law and the laws
of some other states), without man-
dating a readability formula or a
myriad of grammatical detail (as in
Connecticut's plain language law and
a number of state insurance laws).
Fortunately, clarity and read-
ability are more complementary than
competitive. Up to a point we can
have both. A preoccupation with
clarity alone implies that optimum
readability is automatic.
Flesch's preoccupation with
readability even to the point of
derogating from clarity (and, in some
instances, substance) is revealed in
his recent attack on a piece of
"shredded law:' which he unsuc-
cessfully undertook to redraft.g
Although he might have produced a
more adequate result had he done the
kind of checking that for the profes-
sional draftsman should be routine,
his kit lacked many necessary tools2o
During a recent conference on
"plain English:' one critic of simpli-
fication believed that he had ex-
posed a fatuity by citing instances
in which "simplification" has pro-
duced longer rather than shorter re-
sults. But for a person who seeks
clarity rather than adherence to a
mechanical formula, this is no occa-
sion for embarrassment. The point
is especially relevant to the short
sentences favored by the readability
formulas. Psycholinguists have re-
cently shown that, because the struc-
ture of an unavoidably complicated
idea is normally hierarchical, it is
better grasped if framed in sentences
long enough to accommodate appro-
priate clauses and subclauses than if
chopped up into short sentences
whose interrelationships are accord-
ingly obscured. "[Wlhen we remove
relative clauses, we remove the
logical connectors that give meaning
and coherence to a sentence: '21
Redish has summarized it well:
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The potential harm in writing
directly to the formula is that you
may not be changing the aspects of the
passages that are really causing the
difficulty. Moreover, the results may
end up sounding like a first grade
primer, like what has been called the
"Dick and Jane" style of writing. This
can be insulting, uninteresting and in
fact less understandable than more
normal writing.2 2
Specifications for a
"Plain English" Statute
It would be useful to have a uni-
form or model language simplifica-
tion act addressed to "consumer"
transactions (appropriately limited
and defined), where it is desirable
to require language that is clear to a
modest level of readership. It should
be general, rather than detailed, and
it should rely mainly on general
performance standards of clarity
and readability, bolstered, perhaps,
by suggested, otherwise neglected
specifics to be taken into account,
without requiring semantic preci-
sion or forbidding technical language
that is generally familiar to the audi-
ence or for which no satisfactory
"plain English" substitute exists.
The suggested specifics should
be limited to matters of format (such
as type face, ink-to-paper contrast,
paragraphing, and cross-referencing]
that are usually ignored or played
down in the standard texts on legal
writing or legal drafting. Attempts
to list the full range of profession-
ally useful devices that improve clar-
ity or readability would be cumber-
some, controversial, and inevitably
incomplete. And to avoid any un-
desirable negative implication thai
might arise from the inclusion ol
some devices and omission of others,
the act should do no more than re-
cite that the draftsman should keep
in mind the full range of relevant
professionally accepted drafting
devices that improve clarity and
readability.
It seems undesirable, in such a
law, to try to control the drafting
of legal instruments other than "con-
sumer" instruments, many of which
can accommodate language that
would subvert a "plain English" law.
Because many of the enterprises
concerned do business in more than
one state, a uniform act, if feasible,
would be appropriate. The main ar-
gument for a model act is that a
"plain English" law should be dove-
tailed with existing laws dealing
with particular kinds of instruments
such as insurance policies. This ac-
counts for the main differences be-
tween Hawaii's law and New York's.
Non-uniformity is guaranteed by any
provision that sanitizes all provi-
sions that are required or permitted
by existing law, which undoubtedly
differ considerably among the states.
The problem can be alleviated by
amending the related laws.
First of all, language that is
merely permitted by other law
should not be allowed to preempt an
important consumer safeguard.
Merely permissive provisions can be
repealed or, if needed for other pur-
poses, overridden or supplemented
by the more stringent requirements
of the "plain English" law.
Preexisting legal rules that man-
date specific language should like-
wise be examined. If the mandate re-
lates to a mere phrase or provision,
the legislature may want to preserve
it. But this would not necessarily
require exempting the rest of the in-
strument from simplification. The
uniform act could simply exempt
the mandated provision or require
that mandated provisions likely to
cause significant trouble for the con-
sumer be supplemented by appro-
priate definitions, examples, or
explanations.
E ANNIE'SI OUSE
New Jersey's recognition of the
validity of "technical terms and
terms of art" might be more effec-
tive if it provided that under the
standards of its act any unfamiliar
technical term for which there is no
suitable replacement, definition, or
explanation may be disregarded for
the purposes of the act.
Where an entire form is in-
volved, the chances are great that it
is afflicted with many deficiencies
that the language simplification acts
are intended to discourage. If man-
dated by statute, the form should be
carefully scrutinized and appropri-
ately amended. If mandated by reg-
ulation, it should not be exempted
from coverage.
In general, requiring specific
language in a statute of regulation
makes it harder to maintain stand-
ards of good draftsmanship. Felsen-
feld and Siegel cite this instance:
... A look at one form used for the
installment sale of an automobile re-
vealed ten different statutes or regula-
tions. One effect of those particular
requirements was to turn what might
have been a clear and expository con-
tract into a thicket of legal boiler
plate.23
Even as modest an example as
the Federal Trade Commission's re-
quirement that a consumer product
warranty state that "This warranty
gives you specific legal rights, and
you may also have other rights I-
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Plain Language
which vary from state to state"24 cre-
ates a dilemma for the draftsman who
finds it more appropriate to draft in
the third person or to follow the
Fowler convention of using "that" in-
stead of "which" when introducing a
restrictive clause. It is preferable that
the statute or regulation state the
substance of the requirement and let
the draftsman select the language
that best fits the particular instru-
ment. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion's door-to-door sales rule pro-
vides the needed leeway by requiring
the statement concerned "in substan-
tially the following form: ..."25
It seems appropriate that a
"plain English" law fix monetary
limits on the transactions covered
and on penalties and attorneys' fees.
The former help define the kind of
consumers who need protection. The
latter help avoid penalties so dispro-
portionate that juries would be
tempted not to apply them.
New Jersey's exemption of provi-
sions supplied by the consumer
makes good sense. A lessor, warran-
tor, or contractor should not be re-
sponsible for the self-inflicted disap-
pointments of a complainant.
As for enforcement, a suit for
reformation to reduce the risk of fi-
nancial loss helps forestall later and
more burdensome litigation. Injunc-
tive relief is also helpful. Whether a
disposition or contractual arrange-
ment should be voided for bad
draftsmanship should be left to
general principles of common law
regarding unconscionability, bad
faith, lack of necessary intent, and
so forth. A statement to this effect
would head off negative implications
that might otherwise arise out of the
express remedies.
Full performance is a suitable
defense to a suit for damages, be-
cause it eliminates the element of
injury. It should also be a defense
to a suit for reformation, because
the need has disappeared. Under
conventional doctrine, it would also
head off conventional punitive dam-
ages. Whether it should make unde-
sirable a separate statutory action
for a penalty is debatable.
In view of the chronic ineptitude
of lawyers in matters of drafting, the
mere presence of plaintiffs attorney
at the time of signing should not dis-
qualify a plaintiff from taking ac-
tion, as it does in New York. Nor
should "good faith" be a defense in
any instance, because the predomi-
nant cause of bad drafting is inepti-
tude rather than bad faith. Lawyers
need to be more fully motivated to im-
prove their performance in this area.
Other Factors
Affecting Readability
A matter stressed by Felsenfeld
and Siegel26 is the importance of
format and layout. The Document
Design Center,27 American Institute
for Research, in Washington, D.C.,
which is mainly concerned with
clarity, also concentrates heavily on
format. So also the Communications
Design Center of Carnegie-Mellon
University. Format includes type face
and size, margins, blank spaces, line
length, space between lines, and
other typographical features. Paper
color and ink-to-paper contrast also
affect readability. These efforts are
bearing fruit.
Except where it is prescribed by
law, the draftsman has wide control
over the format of private legal in-
struments. He has much less control
over the format of statutes and regu-
lations. Except for instruments
aimed at the general public, the
notion of "plain English" or "plain
language" should be abandoned in
favor of a concept of readability,
appropriate to the audiences respec-
tively addressed, that is deferential
to the superior values of substance
and clarity and is realizable only
through the application of a large
miscellany of well-tested rules. Many
of these are covered by the readabil-
ity conventions set forth in the rest
of this chapter and in chapter 9.
Despite the skeptics and the
necessary reservations, we know that
without violating any significant
substantive objective we can do a
considerable amount of useful sim-
plification to improve clarity and
readability. We know it because it
has been done, not only in the
academic ivory tower, but in the
sterner environment of the so-called
"real world." E
Reed Dickerson is a Professor of
Law at the University of Indiana Law
School. His extensive experiences in
drafting federal legislation and his
well-known books and articles have
made him the number one authority
on legislative drafting in the United
States. His books include Legislative
Drafting, The Fundamentals of Legal
Drafting, The Interpretation and Ap-
plication of Statutes and Materials on
Legal Drafting.
Footnotes
16. E.g., Redish, "Readability, in Drafting Docu-
ments in Plain Language" 157 (Practising
Law Institute, "Commercial Law and Prac-
tice Course Handbook Series No. 203:'
1979).
17. Charrow, "What is 'Plain English,' Anyway?:'
Publication Cl (Document Design Center,
American Institutes for Research, 1979),
p. 4; DCB 279. As for what the future may
hold, see Holland, "Psycholinguistic Alter-
natives to Readability Formulas" (American
Institutes for Research, Wash. D.C. 1981).
18. "The Flesch test cannot differentiate be-
tween sentences and nonsentences; be-
tween sense and nonsense; between the
comprehensible and the incomprehensible"
Charrow, "Let the Rewriter Beware 6"
(mimeo, available from the author at Amer-
ican Institutes for Research, Wash. D.C.,
1978).
19. Flesch, "How to Write Plain English" 10205(1979).
20. To achieve greater technical "readability'
Flesch sacrificed substantive accuracy. He
also impaired clarity by introducing am-
biguities, elegant variation, lack of struc-
tural parallelism, confusing syntax, and a
more complicated hierarchy of contingen-
cies. To complete the irony, he adopted
the very device he castigated - tabulation
- and then, by failing to indent the tabu-
lated material, created a syntactic ambi-
guity.
But defects in Flesch's redraft in no
way lessen the original's possible vulner-
ability. What, if anything, could be done to
improve its readability without impairing
accuracy or clarity?
21. Charrow, supra note 17.
22. Redish, supra note 15, at 127.
23. Felsenfeld & Siegal, "Writing Contracts in
Plain English" 50 (1981).
24. 16 CFR 701(3)(a).
25. 16 CFR 429(a), 17 F.R. 22934.
26. Felsenfeld & Siegel, "Writing Contracts in
Plain English," ch. 8 (1981).
27. Under the capable direction of Janice C.
Redish, who is also co-author of several
excellent manuals. E.g., Felker (and
others), "Guidelines for Document
Designers" (American Institutes for Re-
search, Wash, D.C., 1981).
716 JULY, 1985 MICHIGAN BAR JOURNAL
